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THE EFFECT OF A MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRATION STATUTE
ON RESULTING TRUSTS IN AUTOMOBILES*
A RESULTING trust is an implied trust based on the intentions of parties
to a transfer of property. Their intentions may be presumed from the nature
of the transaction.' Thus when A pays the consideration for a transfer of
property from B to C, the law presumes that A and C intend to create a
trust with C as trustee for A's benefit. 2 C is considered to have taken a bare
legal title to the property; the beneficial or equitable interest in the property is
in A. Although the doctrine was developed with regard to land,3 it also applies
to personal property,4 in which case the presumption that the parties intended
to create a trust rather than to execute a gift appears to be stronger.5 However,
the ownership of an important item of personal property, motor.. vehicles, is
regulated by statutes which require registration of title. Since ownership is
declared to be in the holder of the certificate of title, such statutes may be
construed to abolish the resulting trust doctrine which recognizes that owner-
ship may be in someone other than the legal titleholder.0
*In re Estate of Case, 161 Ohio St. 288, 118 N.E.2d 836 (1954).
1. McGovern v. Knox, 21 Ohio St. 547 (1871); 3 Scott, TRUSTS § 440 (1939);
Gilmer, Current Developments in Resulting Trusts and Constructive Trusts in Kentucky,
42 Ky. L.J. 455 (1954). Three types of resulting trusts are generally recognized: those
resulting from the failure of an express trust; those resulting from the exhaustion of
an express trust; and those resulting from purchase transactions in which one person
pays the consideration and another takes title. The third type is known as a purchase
money resulting trust.
Where the trust relationship is created by an express agreement, either written or
oral, an express trust arises. 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 2.1, 17.1, 23 (1939). Express trusts
in land must be in writing in order to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Ibid. But resulting
trusts in land need not satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 3 Scow, TRUSTS § 440 (1939).
2. Cropper v. Lambertson, 174 Md. 24, 197 At. 576 (1933) ; Chichester v. Chichester,
209 Miss. 628, 48 So. 2d 123 (1950); 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 440 (1939). When property
is purchased in the name of certain relatives who would normally be the object of the
purchaser's bounty, the transaction results in a presumption of gift. Link v. Emrich, 346
Ill. 238, 178 N.E. 480 (1931); 3 Scow-, TRUSTS § 442 (1939).
3. 3 Scow, TRUSTS § 404 (1939).
4. Bullman v. Edney, 232 N.C. 465, 61 S.E2d 338 (1950) (automobile); Norman v.
Burks, 93 Cal. App. 2d 687, 209 P.2d 815 (1949) (realty, home furnishings, ring, and
other personalty); Reynolds v. Kenney, 87 N.H. 313, 179 Atl. 16 (1935) (bonds) ; 2A
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 454 n.34 (1953); 3 ScoT, TRUSTS § 440 (1939).
5. "A different rule [from that of land], however, prevails as to a trust in personal
property, and the owner thereof can impress it with a trust by means and acts that would
be wholly insufficient to impress a trust upon the title to land." Richards v. Parsons, 7
Ohio App. 422, 426 (1916).
6. Motor vehicle registration statutes may be compared to the Statute of Frauds to
the extent that they require a written instrument, the registration certificate, to evidence
ownership of the motor vehicle. It is well recognized that the Statute of Frauds does not
affect resulting trusts. See note 1 supra. Similarly, several courts have already con-
cluded that motor vehicle registration statutes do not abolish resulting trusts in motor
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In the recent case of lit re Estate of Casc,7 an administrator sought to have
a resulting trust declared in two Cadillacs. Decedent had purchased and paid
for both automobiles.8 He retained possession of the vehicles, exercised com-
plete dominion over them, and paid all the expenses incurred in their operation
and maintenance. But he had their titles placed in his daughter's name. The
Probate Court declared a resulting trust,10 but was overruled by an appellate
court which held that the automobiles had been a gift to the daughter." The
Ohio Supreme Court, disregarding the gift rationale, " affirmed on the basis of
its interpretation of the Ohio Certificate of Motor Vehicle Title Law. a The
vehicles. Henry v. General Forming, Ltd., 33 Cal. 2d 2-3, 200 P.2d 785 (1943); Dee v.
Sutter, 222 SAV.2d 541, 543 (Mo. App. 1949) (dictum); Majors v. Majors, 349 Pa. 334,
338, 37 A2d 528, 529 (1944) (same). See also note 30 infra. Although the Ohio statute
is more rigid than some of the statutes involved in these cases, the Ohio court %%-as not
compelled to construe it so as to abolish completely resulting trusts in motor vehicles.
See pp. 460-63 infra.
7- 161 Ohio St. 28, 118 N.E.2d 836 (1954).
8. One of the vehicles was paid for with deeedent's funds, and the other vas partly
financed by a loan secured by a note. Decedent and his daughter both signed the note
as co-makers, but decedent paid the debt with his own funds. Transcript of Record,
pp. 6-10, it re Case's Estate, 161 Ohio St. 283, 118 N.E.2d 836 (1954).
9. There were two short periods of time during which the daughter used each
vehicle with decedent's permission. Id. at 6-11.
10. It re Estate of Case, No. 148,451, P. Ct., Franklin County, Ohio, Oct. 13, 1952.
11. It re Estate of Case, 121 N.E.2d 679 (Ohio App. 1953). Since the transfer of
the property in this case was to the daughter of the purchaser, there is a presumlption of
gift. See note 2 supra. The appellate court held that the presumption of gift vas not
rebutted by the administrator and that therefore no resulting trust would he declard.
Id. at 683.
12. Apparently the court felt that, if no statute were involVLd, the evidence ---ould not
require that the daughter be given the vehicles. See note 26 infra. But if the c urt fkt
that the equities of the situation required that the daughter have the vehicles, it could have
reached that result by using the presumption of gift. See note 11 mipra. However, the
court based its decision entirely on its interpretation of the statute and refuscd to con-
sider the gift possibility.
13. OHio Ray. CODE c. 4505, § 4505.04 (1951).
"Certificate of title as evidence of ownership.
"No person acquiring a motor vehcile from the owner thereof, whether such owner be
a manufacturer, importer, dealer, or otherwise, hereafter shall acquire any right, title,
claim, or interest in or to said motor vehicle until he shall have had issued to him a
certificate of title to said motor vehicle, or delivered to him a manufacturer's or im-
porter's certificate for the same; nor shall any waiver or estoppel operate in favor of such
person against a person having possession of such certificate of title, or manufacturer's or
importer's certificate for said motor vehicle for a valuable consideration. No court in
any case at law or in equity shall recognize the right, title, claim, or interest of any person
in or to any motor vehicle, hereafter sold or disposed of, or mortgaged or encumbered,
unless evidenced by a certificate of title or manufacturer's or importer's certificate duly
issued, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter." The section was amended in
1953 to permit ownership to be evidenced by stipulations of the parties or admission in
the pleadings as well as by a duly issued certificate of title.
Ohio has one of the most rigid and elaborate statutes, on its face, in this field. For
an example of the rigidity with which the statute has been applied, see Kelley Kar Co. v.
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court held that since the wording of the statute clearly prohibited all courts
from recognizing any interest in a motor vehicle other than that evidenced
by the certificate of title, the statute must be construed as having completely
abrogated the resulting trust doctrine as to such vehicles."'
The court recognized, however, that the statute does not preclude a finding
of ownership in someone other than the holder of the certificate of title where
fraud or theft is involved.15 In the case of theft the exception is apparently
based on a section of the statute which provides for the cancellation of certifi-
cates to stolen vehicles. 16 But in the case of fraud there is no statutory
authorization for an exception to the rigid wording of the motor vehicle
registration statute.' 7 Yet In re Estate of Case approved those decisions which,
when fraud was involved, held the certificate of title void ab initio and recog-
nized interests in motor vehicles not evidenced by a certificate.1 8 Thus even
this court is apparently unwilling to be bound by a strictly literal interpretation
of the statute where the equities of a situation require a contrary result.10
Finkler, 155 Ohio St. 541, 99 N.E.2d 665 (1951). See also Comment, 37 Mici. L. Ruv.
758 (1939).
14. In re Estate of Case, 161 Ohio St. 288, 293, 118 N.E.2d 836, 839 (1954).
Section 4505.04 is really not as clear as the court decides. It specifically provides that
"no person acquiring a motor vehicle ... shall [have] any waiver or estoppel operate in
[his] favor . . . against a person having possession of such certificate of title . . . for
said motor vehicle for a valuable consideration." This implies that even under this
statute waiver or estoppel can operate in favor of one in possession of a motor vehicle
against the holder of the certificate of title if the titleholder had not given consideration
for the certificate. Yet, if a court allowed waiver or estoppel to operate against the
holder of the certificate, it would be recognizing an interest in the motor vehicle not
evidenced by a certificate of title. This is precisely what the Ohio court concluded the
statute did not allow.
15. "It is to be noted that neither fraud nor theft is involved in the instant case. This
decision will not control in a situation where the facts may warrant a decision that a
certificate of title under the Ohio act is voidable on account of fraud." In re Estate of
Case, 161 Ohio St. 288, 293, 118 N.E.2d 836, 839 (1954).
16. OHIo REv. CODE § 4505.17 (1953). See discussion of this section in Mock v.
Kaffits, 75 Ohio App. 305, 62 N.E.2d 172 (1944).
17. The only sections of the Certificate of Motor Vehicle Title Law which refer to
fraud are OHIO Rav. CODE §§ 4505.19, 4505.99 (1953). These sections are penal in nature
and make no provision for what shall be done when a certificate of title is issued on the
basis of a fraudulent application. If the reasoning of the instant case interpreting OHIo
Rv. CODE § 4505.04 (1953) were to apply with regard to such a certificate of title, a
court would have no alternative but to recognize title in a motor vehicle based on a
fraudulently procured certificate.
18. Associates Discount Corp. v. Colonial Finance Co., 88 Ohio App. 205, 98 N.E.2d
848 (1950); Mock v. Kaffits, 75 Ohio App. 305, 62 N.E.2d 172 (1944); Automobile
Finance Co. v. Mundy, 137 Ohio St. 504, 30 N.E.2d 1002 (1940).
19. Compare Automobile Finance Co. v. Mundy, 137 Ohio St. 504, 30 N.E.2d 1002
(1940) (plaintiff not permitted to rely on a fraudulently procured certificate to establish
ownership in a replevin action), with Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler, 155 Ohio St. 541, 99
N.E.2d 665 (1951) (bona fide purchaser possessing certificate of title based on a previous




If courts are competent to declare an exception for fraud to a statute which
on its face provides no such exception, there is no reason why they should
not also recognize resulting trusts under the same statute. Many legitimate
reasons exist for having title to property in one person's name when the con-
sideration is paid by another ;20 and the resulting trust doctrine was developed
by courts of equity to give effect to the intention of the parties under such
circumstances. 21 On the other hand, equity will not enforce resulting trusts
for the benefit of payors when the transaction has been tainted with fraud
or illegality. 22 Therefore, to refuse to recognize resulting trutsts in automobiles
because of the registration statute is to deprive innocent purchasers of such
property for the benefit of unconscionable transferees.23
Refusing the payor the right of equitable ownership would also unjustly
injure third parties who have interests in the payor's property. Creditors have
rights to property equitably owned by their debtor,2 4 and heirs have rights
20. The following includes the more important reasons: to provide security for a debt
owed by the purchaser to the transferee; to permit an agent to purchase property in his
own name for the benefit of his principal; to facilitate a conditional sale by leaving legal
title in the vendor; to facilitate a loan arrangement by putting title in the lender's name;
to facilitate resale as where several persons contribute to the payment of the purchase
price or where the purchaser is married and lives in a state which recognizes dower
rights; and to provide convenience to the purchaser in the actual transfer of title. 3 Scow,
TRusTs § 440 (1939).
The argument is sometimes made that only improper motives lead to a purchase in
this manner and that resulting trusts should therefore be abolished to prevent wrong-
doers from benefiting from their wrongdoing. In fact, however, recognition of resulting
trusts often prevents the accomplishment of fraudulent objcctives by recognizing in the
wrongdoer the very property interest which he seeks to have found in someone else. Thus,
if decedent's purpose in the instant case were to give the vehicles to his daughter on his
death without payment of any estate tax thereon, judicial recognition of the resulting
trust would defeat his attempt to evade the tax. Aud in situations in which a resulting
trust is declared in favor of creditors, injury to the creditors is prevented. See discus-
sion in Dorrington v. Jacobs, 213 Wis. 521, 252 NAV. 307 (1934).
21. 2A BoGaEr, TRUSrS A'ND TRUSTEES § 454 (1953); 3 Scot, TRUSTS § 404 (1939).
22. Genth v. Gardner, 85 Colo. 52, 273 Pac. 644 (1928); Watson v. Poore, 18 Cal.
2d 302, 311, 115 P.2d 478, 483 (1941) (dictum); Makinen v. George, 19 Wash. 2d 340,
352-53, 142 P2d 910, 916-17 (1943) (same); 2A BoGEar, TRusTs AD TRusrzs §463
(1953); 3 Scott, TRusTs § 444 (1939).
23. Dean Ames, a noted critic of the doctrine of resulting trusts, commented as fol-
lows on those cases which rejected resulting trusts on the basis of statutes which spedfic-
ally abolished them: "It is a step forward, even if a short step, to abolish the artificial
presumption of a resulting trust because of the mere payment of the purchase money, for
such a presumption favors the buyer unduly. But it is a long step backw%-ard to dClare
that the statute penalizes the innocent buyer to the aggrandizement of the unconscionable
grantee." "[Such statutes are] shockingly unjust in enriching the faithless grantee at
the expense of the trusting buyer; . . . ." A.ass, Construcliz, Trusts Based upon the
Breach of an Express Oral Trust of Land in Lzcruazs ox LEGAL HST=O" 425, 433
(1913).
24. Sayers v. Flack, 190 N.W. 965 (Iowa 1922); Lyons v. Urgalones, 189 Mass.
424, 75 N.E. 950 (1905); Currie v. Look, 14 N.D. 482, 106 NAV 131 (1906) ; 2A Booe-r,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 454 (1953) ; 3 Scott, TRusrs § 407 (1939).
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to property equitably owned by their intestate.25 Such third parties have no
control over the actual placing of the title in someone else's name, but they
would be deprived of their interests if resulting trusts in automobiles were
abolished. In the instant case, for example, decedent's heirs may have been
denied property which, except for the motor vehicle registration statute, might
have been awarded to them. 2 6
Moreover, the court could have recognized a resulting trust under that sec-
tion of the Ohio motor vehicle statute which provides for the issuance of cer-
tificates of title upon proof "of the transfer of ownership . .. by operation of
law" or by "[certain contractual arrangements] or other similar agreement."2 7
This section clearly recognizes that courts can enforce interests in automobiles
other than those interests which are evidenced by a registration certificate.2 8
And since a resulting trust is an implied trust based on the intentions of the
25. Montgomery v. McNutt, 214 Ala. 692, 108 So. 752 (1926); Exchange Trust Co.
v. Godfrey, 128 Okla. 108, 261 Pac. 197 (1927) ; Lew You King v. Lew Kay, 174 Wash.
83, 24 P.2d 596 (1933); 2A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEs § 454 (1953); 3 ScoTT,
TRUSTS § 407 (1939).
26. "Except for the effect of the statute we could agree that the evidence warrants
the conclusion that the decedent transferrcd the automobiles or caused them to be trans-
ferred to the daughter under circumstances raising an inference that he intended to have
transferred to her a bare legal title and not to give her the beneficial interest. Such would
be a typical case of resulting trust." In re Estate of Case, 161 Ohio St. 288, 292, 118
N.E2d 836, 838 (1954). Contra, In re Estate of Case, 121 N.E.2d 679, 683 (Ohio App.
1953).
27. OaIo REv. CODE § 4505.10 (1953):
"Certificate of title when ownership changed by operation of law.
"In the event of the transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle by operation of law, as
upon inheritance, devise or bequest, order in bankruptcy, insolvency, replevin, or execu-
tion sale, or whenever the engine of a motor vehicle is replaced by another engine, or
whenever a motor vehicle is sold to satisfy storage or repair charges, or repossession is
had upon defaidt in performance of the terms of a chattel mortgage, trust receipt, condi-
tional sales contract, or other similar agreement, the clerk of the court of common pleas
of the county in which the last certificate of title to said motor vehicle was issued, upon
the surrender of the prior certificate of title or the manufacturer's or importer's certificate,
or, when that is not possible, upon presentation of satisfactory proof to the clerk of owner-
ship and right of possession to such motor vehicle, and upon payment of the fce prescribed
in section 4505.09 of the Revised Code, and presentation of an application for certificate
of title, may issue to the applicant a certificate of title to such motor vehicle. Only an
affidavit by the person or agent of the person to whom possession of such motor vehicle
has passed, setting forth the facts entitling him to such possession and ownership, together
with a copy of the journal entry, court order, or instrument upon which such claim of
possession and ownership is founded, is satisfactory proof of ownership and right of posses-
sion. If the applicant cannot produce such proof of ownership, he may apply directly to
the registrar of motor vehicles and submit such evidence as such applicant has, and the
registrar may thereupon, if he finds the evidence sufficient, authorize the clerk to issue
a certificate of title . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
28. Since the section authorizes clerks to issue certificates of title upon a court order
that a motor vehicle has been transferred by law, the court must be able to hold that title
has been transferred even though the certificate of title has not been transferred.
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NOTES
parties, it may be considered as transferring ownership by operation of law
or as an agreement analogous to those specifically mentioned in this section.1
If motor vehicle registration statutes warrant modification of the resulting
trust doctrine, a more reasonable solution would be to abolish only the pre-
sumption that, where title was placed in someone other than the payor, the
parties to a transfer of property must have intended to create a trust rather
than to execute a gift.30 This would eliminate the advantage which the pre-
sumption provides the purchaser, but would nevertheless allow him to prove
the relationship actually intended by the parties. Thus interpreted, the statute
would create a presumption of ownership in the legal titleholder which might
be overcome by the extraordinary degree of proof required to establish a result-
ing trust.31 Such proof would include evidence of dominion over, use of, and
enjoyment of the property as well as evidence of the circumstances of the
underlying transaction and the payment of the purchase price.
The intention of the Ohio legislature in passing the motor vehicle registra-
tion statute was "to prevent the importation of stolen motor vehicles and
29. It has been held that a resulting trust is a relationship created by operation of
law. Campanello v. Mercer, 124 Mont. 528, 227 P.2d 312 (1951); Young v. Greer, 2:,0
Ala. 641, 35 So. 2d 619 (1943) ; Albert v. Albert, 148 Kan. 527, 83 P.2d 795 (1933).
The creation of a resulting trust may be considered as the recognition of an implied-
in-fact agreement. The trust is based on the presumed intentions of the parties inferred
from the circumstances of a transfer of property. If the presumption of intention is not
rebutted, an agreement between the parties that the titleholder is to hold only for the
benefit of the purchaser is established. See 3 Scott, Tn.Tsrs §§ 404, 404.1, 4042 (1939).
Such an implied-in-fact agreement would be similar in the nature of its origin to an
implied-in-fact contract which is also inferred from the circumsances of a tranractun
in order to enforce the intentions of the parties. See I XVILasTON, Co:TPAcrs § 3 (rev.
ed. 1936).
30. Elimination of the presumption which the resulting trust doctrine establisics in
favor of the purchaser would call into play the presumption of ownership in favor of the
titleholder which many courts have said is provided by the mutor vehicle registration
statutes. Speck Cadillac-Olds. v. Goodman, 373 Pa. 33, 95 A.2d 191 (1953); Wren v.
Bankers Inv. Co., 207 Okla. 339, 249 P.2d 712 (1952); INash Miami Motors Y. Bandel,
47 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1950) ; Burakowski v. Grustas, 134 Conn. 205, 56 A2d 461 (1947) ;
Junkin v. Anderson, 12 Wash. 2d 58, 120 P.2d 543 (1941). Apparently the ther"ry is
that the motor vehicle purchaser is bound by constructive notice of te registration
statute's provision that ownership is in the titleholder. Therefore he may be presumed to
have intended to execute a gift when he had the vehicle registered in another person's name.
31. The proof of a resulting trust must be by dear, cogent, convincing, and unequivo-
cal evidence. Hadley v. Kays, 121 Ind. App. 112, 93 N.E_.2d 237 (1951) ; Sines v. Ship~-
192 Md. 139, 63 A.2d 743 (1949) ; Carrillo v. O'Hara, 400 Ill. 518, 81 X.E2d 513 (1943).
A previous Ohio case, Douglas v. Hubbard, 91 Ohio App. 200, 107 N.E.2d B4 (1951),
appeal dismissed, 157 Ohio St. 94, 104 N.E.2d 182 (1952), stated that the statute did not
remove motor vehicles from the law of resulting trusts and recognized a resulting trut
in a truck. Finding a sufficiently high degree of proof to rebut the presumption of ovner-
ship furnished by the certificate of title, the appellate court held that the legal title aE
evidenced by a certificate of title could be in one person and beneficial interest in another.
See 101 L PA. L. REv. 425 (1952). Though the Douglas case was urged in the appellant's
brief, Brief for Appellants, pp. 2, 5, 8, In re Estate of Case, 161 Ohio St. 283, 118 N.E2d
836 (1954), the instant case apparently overrules it without any reference to it.
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thefts and frauds in the transfer of title to motor vehicles ..... 82 Attainment
of this purpose does not preclude courts from ascertaining the circumstances
under which a certificate of title was registered in a given name.38 The recog-
nition of a resulting trust in a transaction in which neither theft nor fraud is
involved would not conflict with the letter or the spirit of the statute. And the
doctrine of resulting trusts recognizes that such trusts are unenforceable
against bona fide purchasers without notice. 34 The court has unnecessarily
overturned a well established legal doctrine.
32. 117 OHio H.J. 323 (1937). See cases cited note 18 supra. There is no indication
of any legislative intent to abolish resulting trusts in motor vehicles. If this had been
the legislative intent, it could have been specifically indicated as in those few statutes
which prohibit the recognition of purchase money resulting trusts in land. 3 Scovr,
TRUSTS § 440.2 (1939); Gilmer, Current Development it Resulting Trusts and Con-
structive Trusts in Kentucky, 42 Ky. L.J. 455 (1954). The doctrine of resulting trusts
is of such long standing that no court should assume a legislative intent to abolish it in
the absence of an express provision to that effect.
33. Erie County Bank v. Fowl, 71 Ohio App. 220, 227, 49 N.E.2d 61, 65 (1942)
(dictum). The certificate of title is issued by the clerk of the court of common pleas of
the county in which the applicant resides or, in case of an out-of-state resident, of the
county in which the transaction took place. OHio REv. CoDE §§ 4505.06, 4505.08 (1953).
It does not seem reasonable that courts should be absolutely precluded from examining
the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a certificate merely because a clerk has
decided to issue one. If such an examination shows that the certificate holder is without
a right to possession, courts should deny him relief.
34. Patterson v. McKeehen, 168 Okla. 252, 32 P.2d 875, (1934) ; Poppke v. Poppke,
57 S.D. 262, 231 N.W. 933 (1.930); Ransome v. Watson's Adm'r, 145 Va. 669, 134 S.R
707 (1926).
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